Sustainability of Collusion: Evidence from the Late 19th Century Basque Iron and Steel Industry by Pedro Mendi & Róbert F. Veszteg
 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 















Sustainability of Collusion: Evidence from the Late 
19th Century Basque Iron and Steel Industry 
 
Pedro Mendi 
Róbert F. Veszteg  
 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 
Universidad de Navarra 
 Sustainability of Collusion: Evidence from the Late 19th Century Basque Iron and Steel 
Industry 
Pedro Mendi and Róbert F. Veszteg 
Working Paper No.04/07 
June 2007 
JEL No. L13, L41, N84 











This paper presents evidence on actual collusive agreements from the late 19th 
Century iron and steel industry in Spain. We examine the minutes of the 
executive boards of two Basque firms, Altos Hornos de Bilbao and Vizcaya, to 
discuss the relevance of different factors on survival and failure of a number of 
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that collusion was more likely to break down in periods of falling demand, and 
that strong demand provides these agreements with stability. Additionally, we 
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   1 Introduction
Spanish production of iron and steel production in the late 19th Century was
mostly concentrated in the Northern regions of Asturias and the Basque Coun-
try. Following discoveries of phosphoric iron ore in the Basque province of Bis-
cay, the production of iron and steel in this region quickly increased in the 1870s
and 1880s and became Spain￿ s most active region, see Houpt (2002). The ￿nal
years of the 19th Century were characterized by alternating episodes of compe-
tition and collusion among the most important producers, until Altos Hornos de
Vizcaya (hereafter AHV) emerged as the dominant ￿rm in the industry in 1901
as a result of the merger of three Biscayan producers of iron and steel: Altos
Hornos de Bilbao (hereafter AHB), Vizcaya, and Iberia. AHV was to become
the leader in the Spanish market throughout most of the 20th Century.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the most important factors that
facilitated the survival of collusive agreements in the iron and steel industry, or,
to the contrary, those that caused their dissolution. In particular, this paper
studies the set of collusive agreements in which AHB and Vizcaya took part
between 1882 and 1901. This is the time span that ranges from the foundation
of AHB and Vizcaya to the merger that led to the foundation of AHV. Evidence
is taken from the minutes of the executive boards of AHB and Vizcaya. These
documents re￿ ect the decisions made by managers of both ￿rms, providing
information on the reasons for such decisions. Hence, our data allow us to focus
on some features of collusive agreements that have been overlooked by tacit
collusion models, and yet are clearly relevant.
An interesting feature of this period is the lack of antitrust law to prevent
and prosecute collusion. More to the contrary, colluding ￿rms practiced explicit,
rather than tacit collusion. Precisely because this lack of antitrust legislation,
minutes of the meetings of the managerial boards of the main ￿rms involved in
the collusive arrangements provide complete evidence on the strategic consider-
ations and arguments related to the establishing, operation and also the ceasing
of di⁄erent collusive arrangements.
If a collusive agreement, tacit or explicit, is to be sustainable, it has to
satisfy the parties￿incentive compatibility constraints, otherwise the parties will
abandon cooperation. Changing circumstances, or perverse incentives provided
by the contract itself, may prevent the incentive compatibility constraints from
being satis￿ed. In this sense, these agreements have a self-enforcing range,
where it is in the parties￿interest to continue cooperation, see Klein (1996). As
soon as at least one of the parties ￿nds itself outside of this self-enforcing range,
cooperation is likely to break down. These situations occur, for instance, after
changes in legislation, demand, or degree of vertical integration. We will later
verify that most of the times collusion broke down not following an individual
deviation from the collusive agreement, but rather because either the initial
arrangement was poorly designed, or after a change in the environment, such
as a decrease in demand.
The theoretical literature on Industrial Organization uses game theoretic
arguments to describe the forces behind collusive agreements, emphasizing that
1the success of a collusive agreements requires repeated interaction that allows
￿rms to punish individual deviations.1 This way, cooperation may be sustained
even if the one-shot equilibrium involves no cooperation, such as in the simple
prisoners￿dilemma game.
In their seminal paper, Green and Porter (1984) propose a model where price
wars, but not deviations, are observed in equilibrium. In a setting of imperfect
information, reversion to competitive pricing is triggered by ￿rms facing unex-
pectedly low demand, to later return to collusive pricing. This model predicts
that no cheating occurs and price wars are part of the collusive equilibrium, and
is tested in Porter (1983), using data on freight rates posted by ￿rms a¢ liated
to the Joint Executive Committee in the 1880s. By contrast, Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986) predict that prices will be countercyclical because in booms, de-
￿ned as a high-demand period followed by some low-demand periods, incentives
to cheat are highest, which calls for price reductions. Ellison (1994) tests these
models using the same dataset as in Porter (1983) to ￿nd that the empirical
results are more supportive of Green and Porter￿ s model, although this author
also acknowledges that the existence of cheating can not be ruled out. Our
paper complements this literature by analyzing the actual causes of collusion
breakdown, as recorded in the memoranda of the management boards of collud-
ing ￿rms. This information is complementary to prices and quantities observed
in Porter (1983) and other articles based on this one.
Our approach is in line with the research presented by a series of papers in
the literature on economic history. Carlos and Ho⁄man (1986) and the follow-
up comment by Nye (1988) took a close look at the North American fur trade in
the early 19th century. They argue that strategic considerations, in particular
a bargaining game under incomplete information between the two companies,
determined market structure as in spite of the mutual bene￿ts of collusion or a
merger the ￿rms were engaged in intense con￿ ict. The merger then eventually
took place, but by that time economic rents had disappeared. Barbezat (1989)
and Peters (1989) report historical evidence on the International Steel Cartel of
1926 and the Rheinish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate before World War I respec-
tively. They point out that due to the numerous di¢ culties of achieving collusive
behavior, i.e. the presence of disintegrative forces such as individual interests,
cheating, heterogeneous products or dynamic market conditions, the intents to
completely eliminate competition among members did not succeed. However,
these problems did not hinder cooperation or partial success. The International
Cartel did limit trade among its members and allowed for the formation of do-
mestic cartels, and also the German Coal Syndicate did operate for over two
decades. Finally, our paper is closely related in its philosophy to Genesove and
Mullin (2001) who take a normative approach in the sense that they ￿uncover
puzzles for established theory, and identify elements that a richer theory should
encompass￿ . The examination of the Sugar Institute formed in 1927 shows
the importance of communication in the operation of a cartel. In particular,
individual deviations or cheating were discussed in the regular meetings. Pun-
1Check, for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995) for an introduction.
2ishment did not mean reversion to competitive conditions as suggested by many
theoretical model, it rather included a tailor-made solution to the problem at
hand.
Empirical results from the experimental laboratory also help us to better
understand the forces behind collusive agreements. Due to the large gap be-
tween naturally occurring markets and theoretical models of industrial organi-
zation, laboratory experiments o⁄er a convenient testbed for checking theoret-
ical predictions and also suggest ways of improving them.2 The main result
on competition in quantities with more than two ￿rms in the lab is that the
observed outcome is more competitive than the theoretical prediction. In case
of duopolies experimenters report data actually consistent with both extreme
results: from perfect collusion to ￿erce competition. Repetition has been ob-
served to decrease cooperation in single-period market games in the laboratory.
In multiperiod games, repetition with the same cohort and with previous co-
horts has been observed to increase cooperation. These results are in line with
the intuition according to which repetition with the same cohort helps to es-
tablish trust and a reputation for punishing individual deviations. Punishment
strategies play an important role of keeping up collusion both theoretically and
empirically. While with two ￿rms a defector can be punished without harming
a cooperative third party, with more players direct punishment may be neces-
sary to enhance cooperation. The e⁄ectiveness of nonbinding communication
in maintaining collusive behavior, though intuitively very important, seems to
depend on the market institution implemented in the lab.3 Finally, Abbink and
Brandts (2006) reports experimental data on duopolies in the lab showing that
collusion is almost three times as frequent in shrinking markets as in growing
ones, moreover prices are more than twice as high.
In line with previous theoretical arguments and empirical ￿ndings, the evi-
dence discussed in this paper suggests that demand ￿ uctuations are indeed play
a crucial role in the sustainability of collusion. Speci￿cally, collusion is likely to
break down in the presence of a declining demand, but an extended period of de-
pression induces ￿rms to seek collusive arrangements. However, we also identify
other determinants of the sustainability of collusive agreements. In particular,
higher tari⁄ protection, the presence of monitoring institutions, and colluding
￿rms having similar degrees of vertical integration facilitate the survival of col-
lusive agreements. We will argue that these factors are indeed relevant, and call
for an enriching of existing models of collusive behavior, especially if they are to
be adapted to a setting where collusion was not illegal but in some cases even
encouraged by governments.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the historical back-
2This part on experimental research in industrial organization is based on Holt (1995).
3Competition among price setting ￿rms has been the objective of several experimental
studies. For example, Dufwenber and Gneezy (2000) study collusion in a static framework
and ￿nd that prices exceed marginal cost for the case of two ￿rms, but are equal in the case
of three and four. Experimental studies on quantity competition provide similar conclusion.
In a recent survey of the literature Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004) argue that while




























Figure 1: Spanish real GDP, 1882-1901. Base year 1882=100
ground, section 3 presents and discusses the di⁄erent collusive agreements reached
throughout the ￿nal decades of the 19th Century, whereas section 4 concludes.
2 Historical background
This section presents a brief discussion of the economic conditions of the Spanish
economy in late 19th Century, as well as an overview of the Spanish iron and
steel industry, including a summary of the history of AHB and Vizcaya.
2.1 The economic environment
The Spanish economy in the late 19th Century was characterized by two distinc-
tive features: recession and a turn towards protectionism. The 1880s and 1890s
witnessed a depression of agriculture, which was common to other European
countries. Carreras and Tafunell (2003) argue that this crisis in agricultural
production was a consequence of the increase in the global supply of agricul-
tural products, especially because of the increase in arable land in North and
South America. Given the relevance of the primary sector in the Spanish econ-
omy at that time, well over 50% of total output, crisis in this sector implied a
feeble demand for industrial products. Figure 1 shows the evolution of Spanish
GDP from 1880 to 1901, where data have been obtained from Carreras and
Tafunell (2003). Real output was ￿ at through most of the period considered,
with some years of negative growth until 1896, when output began its recovery.
4Regarding tari⁄ protection, Spain was not an exceptional case in the gen-
eral turn towards protectionist policies adopted by most European countries in
the late 19th Century. Indeed, protectionist tari⁄s were adopted in Germany,
France, Austria, Italy and Russia, see Bairoch (1989). In the case of Spain, the
1869 Tari⁄ provided relatively low protection, and it was in e⁄ect during the
1880s. However, after several modi￿cations of the 1869 Tari⁄, a new protec-
tionist tari⁄ was introduced in 1891.
The turn towards protectionism can be seen as a result of economic depres-
sion and a reaction towards protectionism in neighboring countries. However,
it is also necessary to keep in mind the relevance of lobby groups in the design
of the Spanish tari⁄ policy in the late 19th Century and early 20th Century. In
particular, the in￿ uence of the domestic iron and steel industry in the choice
of tari⁄ protection was unquestionable. These producers enjoyed higher pro-
tection after the 1891 Tari⁄, the removal of the exemption from tari⁄ duties of
railways materials in 1896, and the 1906 Tari⁄. Furthermore, protection was
greater the more elaborate products were. Indeed, the tari⁄ on pig iron ingot
did not change with the passing of the 1891 Tari⁄ Act, and it remained ￿xed
at 24 pesetas per ton.4 By contrast, protection on ￿nished iron and steel prod-
ucts greatly increased in the 1891 Tari⁄. Producers of ￿nished products were
precisely the customers of ￿rms such as AHB and Vizcaya: protection on these
products ultimately allowed producers or iron and raw steel to raise prices.
The depreciation of the Spanish peseta throughout the 1890s provided ad-
ditional protection for the domestic industry. This way, Spanish producers of
iron and steel were able to charge prices close to the monopoly level without
prompting imports, given the combined protection of high tari⁄s and depreci-
ated peseta. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the exchange rate peseta-pound
from 1880 to 1901. Of special interest is the year 1898, where a maximum of
46.7 pesetas per pound was reached in June.
2.2 The iron and steel industry
The technological changes during the 1880s such as the introduction of Bessemer
and Martin-Siemens converters, implied a fundamental shift in the structure of
the steel industry and also boosted the industrialization of the Spanish economy
overall.5 The production of Spanish iron jumped from 69,149 tonnes per year
in 1876-80 to 184,600 tonnes per year level in 1886-90. The productivity of
￿rms that adopted the new technology increased considerably and many smaller
factories disappeared. The market for iron and steel products in the ￿nal years of
the 19th century was characterized by the recession of 1890-92 and the recovery
starting in 1896. Due to the ￿erce competition and the decreasing price level
the number of ￿rms in the steel industry fell from 54 in 1880 to 15 in 1896.
For example, during the ￿nal ￿ve years of the 19th Century three ￿rms, AHB,
Vizcaya and San Francisco de Mudela, produced 78% of the iron ingot in Spain.
4The price of pig iron ￿uctuated between 55 and 105 pesetas between 1886 and 1901.
5This section summarizes the history of the Spanish ingot cartel during the period 1880-






































Figure 2: Spanish pesetas per British pound, 1882-1901
Finally, in 1897 the total production of iron and steel in Spain was regulated by
syndicates and/or bilateral agreements across producers.
SÆnchez (1945) lists the main producers of iron and steel products that were
active in Spain at the end of the 19th Century. These were concentrated in the
Northern regions of Asturias and the Basque Country. There were three main
producers of pig iron and steel in Biscay: AHB, Vizcaya, and San Francisco.
Their respective capacities were 100,000, 120,000, and 36,000 tonnes of ingot
per year. In contrast to AHB and Vizcaya, San Francisco did not transform pig
iron into steel. In addition to these producers, there were a number of ￿rms
devoted to the transformation of iron and steel into more elaborated products
such as tinplate, wire, or nails. Three works were located in Asturias: Duro
y Compaæ￿a, Mieres, and Moreda y Gij￿n, with capacities 30,000, 24,000, and
16,000 tonnes of ingot per year. Duro y Compaæ￿a and Mieres transformed pig
iron into steel using Martin-Siemens converters.
2.3 AHB and Vizcaya: the early years
This subsection follows GonzÆlez (1985) in providing a description of the in-
vestments undertaken by AHB and Vizcaya in their early years, as well as on
the type of technology used in the production of steel. AHB (Altos Hornos y
FÆbricas de Hierro y Acero de Bilbao) was established in 1882 as the result of
the acquisition and reform of two obsolete works, namely ￿Nuestra Seæora del
Carmen de Baracaldo￿and ￿Nuestra Seæora de la Merced de Guriezo￿ , both
of them belonging to the Ibarra and C￿a. Company. The initial equity was
612,500,000 pesetas, divided into 25,000 shares. The purpose of the works was,
as stated in the ￿rst meeting of the Board of Governors, to develop in Spain a
competitive Bessemer and Martin-Siemens steel making industry. After consid-
ering where in Spain the location of the works would be more pro￿table, Biscay
was chosen, because of its easy access to non-phosphoric iron ore, essential in
the Bessemer process. In particular, AHB signed a contract with Orconera and
Franco-Belga mining companies for the supply of ore at 7 pesetas per ton. The
initial capacity of the blast furnaces was 70,000 tonnes of pig iron ingot in 1883.
AHB was granted in 1886 the exclusive right to use the Bessemer process
in Spain for ￿ve years. Windsor Richards, who was director of the Bolckow,
Vaughan and Co. factory in Middlesbrough, one of Britain￿ s largest works,
was hired as a consultant to supervise the production of iron and steel. The
factory was organized in three di⁄erent sectors: the two blast furnaces, the
Bessemer converters and the transformation sector. A Martin-Siemens converter
started complementing the Bessemer facilities in 1888. In the following years,
the factory undertook investments to integrate forward into the production of
steel plates and backward into the production of coke.
Vizcaya (Sociedad An￿nima de Metalurgia y Construcciones Vizcaya) was
also founded in Bilbao in 1882. Its initial stockholders were Basque entrepre-
neurs related to mining and mercantile activities, and represented a more homo-
geneous group of interests than those of AHB. Vizcaya￿ s equity was initially set
at 12,500,000 pesetas, divided into 25,000 shares. A brand new plant was built,
using Belgian technology. The reason for this choice was that both Benigno and
V￿ctor de ChÆvarri, two of the founders of the society, had studied engineering
in Liege. In June 1883 and December 1885, blast furnaces number one and two,
respectively, were operative. Vizcaya procured iron from the perpetual rent of
the several mines, and Vizcaya undertook a number of investments to integrate
backward into the production of coke.
Regarding the production of steel, Vizcaya installed in 1887 three Martin-
Siemens converters, so as to begin the production of steel, as well as facilities
for the transformation of steel into more elaborate products. In 1889, a fourth
Martin-Siemens converter was built, together with other auxiliary facilities. The
production of steel was started in April 1889, and in March 1891, the ￿rm
began production of rails using ￿Robert￿converters, which did not use scrap
to produce steel, as opposed to the Martin-Siemens process. In 1891, four
puddling furnaces were installed, and a Siemens-Harvey furnace was operative.
With these investments, the capacity of the ￿rm was 60,000 ton. of steel and
3,500-6,000 of puddled iron per year.
Vizcaya was intensely devoted to the production and sale of pig iron early
on, both in the domestic and in the foreign markets. Actually, from the very
beginning this ￿rm sent commercial representatives to Western Europe and the
US. The consequence was a high proportion of ingot sold abroad, more than
50% in the early years of the ￿rm. In 1886-91, 69% of the pig iron ingot sold
was exported. Italy was the most important market for Vizcaya￿ s production of
ingot, with several important contracts signed with the Termi factory in 1888-89,
despite the protectionist Italian tari⁄ of 1887.
7This focus changed after 1891, when the protectionist tari⁄ was passed.
Vizcaya started focusing primarily on the Spanish market, which now became
protected from the outside competition, as the unit pro￿t in steel production
was higher than that coming from the sale of ingot, especially abroad. However,
the fact that the Spanish market for steel products was in a recession up to 1896,
lead to an ine¢ cient production, below capacity in all cases.
3 Competition and collusion, 1886-1901
The purpose of this section is ￿rst to describe the evolution of collusive arrange-
ments where AHB and Vizcaya were active players, before they eventually
merged to create Altos Hornos de Vizcaya in 1901. The second goal is to dis-
cuss the relevance of di⁄erent factors that might facilitate collusion or cause the
dissolution of cartel agreements. It will be argued below that there were several
factors behind the collapse of collusive arrangements, and that there was not a
common reason to explain the failure of all the collusive agreements analyzed.
AHB and Vizcaya started making e⁄orts to reach agreements so as to restrict
competition in the industry very early on. Indeed, the ￿rst collusive agreement
was initiated in 1886, merely four years after AHB and Vizcaya were founded.
Table 1 provides a brief summary of all the arrangements that took place be-
tween 1886 and 1901 and that included AHB and/or Vizcaya. The table displays
information on cartel participants, scope, and duration.
Duration Scope Participants
Feb 1886 - Jan 1888 pig iron Vizcaya, AHB, San Francisco
Mar 1889 - Jun 1891 iron and steel products AHB, Felguera, Mieres, Moreda, Vizcaya (1890)
Jan 1893 - May 1896 iron and steel products Duro, Mieres, Moreda, Vizcaya, AHB + others (1896)
Jul 1894 - Dec 1903 pig iron Vizcaya, AHB, San Francisco (1895)
Feb 1896 - 1900 rails and other products Vizcaya, AHB
Feb 1897 - 1904 iron and steel Duro, Mieres, Moreda, Vizcaya, AHB + others
Table 1: Collusive arrangements in the Spanish iron and steel industry, 1886 -
1901
The table shows that the scope of the arrangements was initially limited
to the market for pig iron, since Vizcaya would not start production of steel
until 1890. Collusion gradually extended throughout the 1890s to include most
iron and steel products, and included not only the Biscayan producers, but
also Asturian producers such as Duro, Felguera, Moreda and Mieres. Indeed,
the 1897 agreement meant the almost complete cartelization of the Spanish
iron and steel industry, which were to persist throughout most of the period to
1936. After the merger between AHB and Vizcaya in 1901, the resulting ￿rm,
Altos Hornos de Vizcaya (AHV), became the unquestionable leader in Central
Siderœrgica, a centralized sales agency, and AHV ￿rm was also to become a
8member of a number of international steel cartels.
3.1 Demand stability and non-members￿pressure
Fluctuations in the level of demand have received close attention as a crucial
factor determining the sustainability of collusion. Green and Porter (1982)
predict that, in the presence of unobservable demand shocks, unexpectedly low
demand levels trigger price wars. These price wars are part of ￿rms￿strategy
to sustain a given collusive outcome, and thus, they should be observed in
equilibrium. By contrast, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) argues that if a high-
demand period is to be followed by a low-demand period, the incentives of
￿rms to deviate from collusion are highest, unless ￿rms adapt the collusive
terms to demand conditions, for example by introducing countercyclical pricing.
Furthermore, there is also extensive evidence that many collusive agreements
are initiated during recessions. In this case, the prospect of several periods of
low demand induces ￿rms to seek understanding in the form of reduced sales.
In addition to ￿ uctuations in demand, if a cartel does not include all ￿rms
in the industry, competitive pressure from these outsiders may be a factor that
introduces instability in the agreement. Non-member ￿rms bene￿t from high
prices imposed by the cartel. If the combined capacity of these ￿rms is small
relative to that of the cartel, its members may take this behavior as given, acting
collectively as a dominant ￿rm. This is likely to be the case in high-demand
periods. However, in the presence of a declining demand, competition from non-
members introduces further reduces the e⁄ective demand for the cartel, which
calls for a modi￿cation of quotas and/or prices. These modi￿cations introduce
disputes among cartel members, which the likelihood of collusion breakdown.
Falling demand and the behavior of ￿rms not included in the cartel was
clearly a factor behind the breaking down of the iron and steel products cartel
in 1891. This agreement was initially signed by AHB together with three works
located in Asturias: Felguera, Mieres, and Moreda.6 Vizcaya joined the agree-
ment only in 1890, once its steel converters became operative. Before entering
the cartel Vizcaya pursued an aggressive pricing strategy so as to gain market
share, given its high installed capacity and its novelty in the market for steel.
However, Vizcaya started production of steel in the midst of a recession, and its
presence outside of the cartel endangered its very stability. Indeed, the cartel
was about to be ￿nished in June 1890 because of competition from Vizcaya, and
Vizcaya then joined precisely as a way to temporarily keep the agreement alive.
The entering of Vizcaya into the agreement called for a redesign of market
shares, which generated discrepancies among cartel members, which were ag-
gravated by the falling domestic demand. The agreement was not to last long,
and it was precisely Vizcaya the one that chose to stop cooperation. The reason
given was the need to react against competition from ￿rms not adhered to the
cartel, which were selling at prices below those set by the cartel. Whereas this
6References: Libro de Actas del C. de A. de AHB, tomo 3, 1887-89, pp. 173, 177, 8 de
marzo de 1889. Libro de Actas del C. de A. de la Vizcaya, tomo 3, p. 213, 10 de julio de
1890.
9would have been less of a problem in an environment of growing demand, in
a low-demand setting, this clearly endangers survival of the agreement: cartel
members realize sales well below the expected level, which may lead towards
ine¢ cient proportion and even ￿nancial distress. Hence, the combination of low
demand and competition from of non-members caused dissolution of the iron
and steel products cartel in 18917.
3.2 Alignment of interests and multimarket contact
The probability of sustainable collusion increases with colluding ￿rms￿similarity
in cost structure, degree of vertical integration, and the number of markets
where they are simultaneously active. Industrial Organization models typically
assume that colluding ￿rms are homogenous, although this was far from true in
the case that we are analyzing. On the other hand, the simultaneous presence of
colluding ￿rms in di⁄erent markets increases the probability of collusion, since
deviation in one market prompts retaliation in every market, see Bernheim and
Whinston (1990).
Di⁄erent degrees of vertical integration created a divergence of interests
among colluding ￿rms in the 1886-88 pig iron cartel. The fact that AHB was
integrated into the production of steel while the remaining ￿rms in the cartel
were not were a source of con￿ ict, which ultimately led towards the dissolution
of the cartel. After the ￿rst attempts in 1885, the cartel (Syndicate) was ￿-
nally born in February 1886 including Vizcaya, San Francisco de Mudela, and
AHB, and following the example of the German steel industry.8 Vizcaya and
San Francisco de Mudela, produced almost exclusively ingot, although AHB was
about to begin the production of steel, using Bessemer technology.
The collusive arrangement speci￿ed ￿xed market shares for cartel members,
and there was a system of penalties and compensations for production exceeding
or falling short of assigned shares. Prices were set by the Syndicate, which
managed orders received by member ￿rms, and had the exclusive right to alter
prices. The agreement was extended to international sales in March 1886.
The problem with this agreement, and the reason why it ultimately broke
down, was that AHB had the incentive to devote most of its production of pig
iron to the production of steel. Hence, the Syndicate had to reject some orders,
and AHB consistently produced below its share, which meant that AHB was a
net receiver of compensation payments from the other two ￿rms. With Vizcaya
considerably increasing its production capacity, and given the ￿xed shares for
the domestic market, Vizcaya could only use its excess capacity on the much
less pro￿table foreign market. This market was subject to increased protec-
tion: for instance, Italy, which absorbed a sizeable amount of production from
Vizcaya, raised tari⁄s in 1887. Thus, the initial design of the cartel agreement
7Libro de Actas del Consejo de Administraci￿n de la Vizcaya, tomo 3, p. 309. June 12,
1891.
8References: Libro de Actas del C. de A. de la Vizcaya, tomo 1, 1882-86. Sesi￿n del 15 de
febrero de 1886, pp. 273-275; 27 de febrero de 1886, p.177; 4 de marzo de 1886, p. 280; 19 de
marzo de 1886, p. 290.
10greatly bene￿ted AHB, since it ensured a constant ￿ ow of revenues through the
sale of ingot or compensation by other ￿rms in addition to sales of steel, which
remained excluded from the agreement. Vizcaya realized about this perverse ef-
fect, and repeatedly tried to renegotiate its share in total sales. Indeed, Vizcaya
demanded at least a 50% share in total sales in January 1888, right before the
Syndicate was dissolved. Hence, in this case the main reason for the breaking
down of collusion was di⁄erences in degree of vertical integration among cartel
members. These di⁄erences generated a perverse incentive on AHB￿ s side to
take advantage of the terms of the agreement, which ultimately led towards the
dissolution of the cartel.
In this line, AHB￿ s refusal to lower prices of pig iron was cited as one of
the reasons given by Vizcaya to quit the cartel. Since AHB was integrated into
the production of steel, it was in this ￿rm￿ s interest to keep the price of iron
ingot high, to raise the cost of competitors in the market for steel products.
This caused Vizcaya to produce at an ine¢ cient scale, well below capacity, an
e⁄ect that is aggravated if foreign markets are becoming more protected. AHB￿ s
reaction to Vizcaya announcing that it would no longer support the syndicate
was to close one of its blast furnaces: AHB expected a period of low prices of pig
iron ingot, rendering its production uneconomical. This suggests that indeed
AHB was actually taking advantage of the Syndicate, obtaining extra revenues
from sales of pig iron.
In contrast to the previous decade, Vizcaya and AHB produced a similar
range of products in the 1890s, and were mainly targeting the domestic market,
especially after the passing of the 1891 Tari⁄ Act. As it was pointed out above,
the gradual increase in tari⁄ protection in Spain as well as in foreign countries
that were markets for Vizcaya￿ s production induced this ￿rm to focus on the
domestic market. Recall that from the very beginning, AHB had a greater
interest in the domestic market. Most of AHB and Vizcaya￿ s business in the
1890s consisted on supplying independent producers of steel products, and they
had an interest in sustaining high steel prices. Hence, the interests of the two
￿rms became more aligned in the ￿nal decade of the 19th Century. Indeed, no
collusive agreement was signed after 1890 where one of the two ￿rms, but not
the other, was present.
Similar degrees of vertical integration also meant that both ￿rms were si-
multaneously present in a large number of markets. Multimarket contact is
expected to be a factor that facilitates collusion, since deviation in one market
should to prompt retaliation in every market. This should in principle explain
the ever-growing number of collusive agreements where AHB and Vizcaya were
present, and the greater stability of these agreements throughout the 1890s.
However, it is striking to observe that actual practice does not exactly ￿t what
the theory predicts, in particular the behavior of ￿rms following the ceasing of
a cartel agreement. For instance, even as Vizcaya announced its exit from the
1889-91 cartel that also included AHB and Asturian producers of iron and steel,
it communicated AHB its willingness to continue cooperation in ￿xing the price
of billets. The theory would predict AHB￿ s retaliation in every market where
Vizcaya was also present, following Vizcaya￿ s exit from the cartel. However,
11AHB accepted Vizcaya￿ s proposal and both ￿rms jointly set prices in the billets
market. A similar situation occurred in May 1896: although collusion among
AHB, Vizcaya and Asturian producers broke up, AHB and Vizcaya continued
cooperation in the market for pig iron and rails.
3.3 Monitoring institutions
Collusion models assume that the mechanism that sustains above-equilibrium
prices is the threat of retaliation if deviations from the collusive agreement
are observed. In these models, it is up to the ￿rms to detect deviations from
speci￿ed market shares or prices, and hence to monitor the behavior of the
rest of the ￿rms included in the cartel. Monitoring e⁄ort may fall short of
the optimal level if such e⁄ort is costly, which reduces the scope for collusion.
Therefore, the presence of a party that is not a producer in the market where
￿rms are colluding, but at the same time bene￿ts from the very existence of the
collusive agreement increases the likelihood of cartel survival. This is because of
this player￿ s incentive to monitor colluding ￿rms￿behavior to ensure the correct
working of the cartel.
In this line, the distinctive feature of the cartel that was initiated in 1894 was
the presence of the "Ibarra e Hijos" maritime company as a watching institu-
tion.9 The agreement initially included sales of iron to be used in the production
of copper, although the agreement was extended to sales of iron, steel and rolled
steel products in 1895. As opposed to the 1886 cartel, the foreign market was
not included in the agreement, mostly because of the low interest of AHB in
exporting.
In 1895 AHB, Vizcaya, and San Francisco, together with Ibarra e Hijos
signed a ￿ve-year agreement with an automatic renewal clause. The treaty
established the market shares for its member, ￿xed prices and granted Ibarra e
Hijos the exclusive right to ship the goods produced by cartel members. Hence,
Ibarra e Hijos had the ability to verify actual sales by cartel members, and
also had the incentive to monitor ￿rms￿behavior. For instance, it had a strong
incentive to verify that no iron was shipped by any other shipping company.
Additionally, Ibarra e Hijos acted as an intermediary in case of disagreement
between ￿rms. The fact that Ibarra e Hijos was not a producer or iron confers
this ￿rm with the independence required for e¢ cient con￿ ict solving, always
seeking the continuation of the agreement. This is undoubtedly a factor that
increases the likelihood of collusion being sustained. The continuing expansive
cycle of the economy and the monopoly power of the syndicate formed by the
three Spanish producers resulted in the highest price level for ingot in Europe.
This success implied the extension of the collusive agreement until 1903, even
after AHV was founded.
The 1886 agreement for sales of pig iron did not originally include a cen-
tralized sales agency, it was introduced only in April 1887, following a proposal
9References: Libro de Actas del C. de A. de AHB, tomo 6, 1893-95, p. 92, 27 de julio de
1894; pp. 98-101, 29 de agosto de 1894. Libro de Actas del C. de A. de la Vizcaya, tomo 4,
1892-95 pp. 290-292.
12by Vizcaya. However, in this case, the existence of a common agent was not
enough to keep the agreement alive. Indeed, as it was pointed out in the previ-
ous subsection, cartel members￿interests were so divergent that the sales agent
of the Syndicate resigned in October 1887. Later, the 1897 cartel, which in-
cluded AHB, Vizcaya and some Asturian producers, also included a centralized
sales agency, which also monitored ￿rms￿behavior.
3.4 Tari⁄ protection and exchange rates
As pointed out in the previous section, tari⁄ protection to the Spanish iron and
steel industry increased in 1891 and in 1896. Simultaneously, other countries
that would potentially become markets for Spanish products were also increasing
tari⁄protection. These changes have two clear e⁄ects. On the one hand, higher
tari⁄protection in the domestic market increases the scope for collusion and the
incentives to collude in the domestic market. On the other hand, higher tari⁄
protection abroad makes it more likely that domestic ￿rms focus on the local
market.
Changes in tari⁄ protection had an important e⁄ect on Vizcaya￿ s strategic
turn in the 1890s. The ￿rm￿ s initial goal was to create a competitive producer
of iron and steel, targeting the international market. However, in the 1890s,
Vizcaya focused more intensively on the Spanish market. This shift was par-
tially motivated by increased tari⁄ protection in destination markets, but it is
also clear that raising tari⁄ protection in the Spanish market increases the op-
portunity cost of targeting foreign markets, since the domestic market becomes
relatively more pro￿table. Hence, this increase in tari⁄ protection increases the
alignment of Vizcaya and AHB￿ s interests. This may be seen by the longer
duration of cartel agreements in the 1890s and the fact that AHB and Vizcaya
continued cooperation in the sale of some products even after the collapse of
collusive agreements with Asturian producers, for instance in 1891 and 1896.
It is also interesting to highlight AHB and Vizcaya￿ s primer reaction to the
passing of the 1891 Tari⁄ Act. These two ￿rms quickly started merger nego-
tiations, although they ended up being unsuccessful because of discrepancies
over the distribution of shares of the new company. However, this may be seen
as a ￿rst attempt to become an industry leader in a highly protected market.
The 1900-01 negotiations were successful, and AHV was created, as a result
of the merger among AHB, Vizcaya and Iberia, a producer of ￿nished steel
products. The di⁄erence in economic environment between 1891 and 1900 was
higher economic growth in 1900 and the existence of a high number of Spanish
￿rms that produced ￿nished iron and steel products. These ￿rms had been
created throughout the 1890s, under the protection of the 1891 Tari⁄, and were
the natural outlet for AHB and Vizcaya￿ s production. The existence of such
customers in the industry rendered the merger more pro￿table, thus increasing
the likelihood of success of the merger negotiations.
In addition to tari⁄s, exchange rates acted as a trade barrier throughout
most of the 1890s. Figure 3 plots the exchange rate of the Spanish peseta to the






































Figure 3: Spanish pesetas per British pound, 1896-99
of the Spanish peseta raised the maximum price that could be charged in the
domestic market. Indeed, because of raising exchange rates, the ￿rms included
in the 1895 cartel agreed in 1897 on adjusting pig iron prices to the average
price in Glasgow plus freight and tari⁄ duties. The price was automatically
adapted whenever the price of Scottish ingot showed a variation of more than
2 schillings. This is additional evidence on the satisfactory functioning of the
cartel, and shows its ability to set prices above the equilibrium level. Indeed,
cartel members had to reduce prices slightly in 1898 in order to avoid imports,
since copper producers explored the possibility of importing iron from Britain
because of prices that they considered to be outrageous. Prices of ingot were
set to such a high level that made the production of other ￿rms competitive
and fostered their entry into the market. For example, Altos Hornos de MÆlaga
started producing ingot in 1898.
4 Conclusions
Theoretical models of tacit collusion typically focus on ￿rms￿incentives to de-
viate and the design of punishment mechanisms to sustain above-equilibrium
prices. However, in the historical case that we are analyzing, late 19th Century
Spanish iron and steel industry, collusion was explicit, materialized in contracts
that were indeed enforceable. This implies that models for tacit collusion may
fail to consider interesting features of actual collusive agreements.
The study of collusive agreements signed by AHB and Vizcaya allows us to
14highlight a number of factors that make collusion more or less sustainable. In
line with previous research, falling demand increases the likelihood of collusion
breakdown, whereas increasing demand, being by strong growth or by a raise
in tari⁄ protection increases the likelihood of collusion being sustained. In
addition to demand, we have to take into account whether the cartel includes
all the ￿rms in the industry or leaves out a signi￿cant number of players. In the
latter case, chances are that the cartel eventually breaks up, especially in the
midst of a recession. However, the transition from cooperation to a price war is
far from instantaneous, and is preceded by intense communication among cartel
members.
The analysis of the Spanish iron and steel industry in the 19th Century
also stresses the relevance of monitoring institutions in order to increase the
likelihood of cartel survival. The 1894 cartel, where Ibarra e Hijos played the
role of sales agent, shipper, and con￿ ict solver, was a success story despite
the fact that one of the members, San Francisco, had a di⁄erent degree of
vertical integration than AHB or Vizcaya, since San Francisco did not produce
steel. The role of tari⁄ protection in the creation and survival of cartels is also
unquestionable. Price setting by cartels was the rule rather than the exception
in the Spanish iron and steel industry after the passing of the 1891 Tari⁄ Act.
This paper may serve as evidence suggesting future avenues of research for
theoretical models of collusion. These models focus on a narrow set of features
and may be enriched from considering other dimensions of cartel agreements,
such as the ones presented in this paper. Hence, an attempt to fully explain the
sustainability of collusion in a particular industry, based on theoretical mod-
els where the determinant of sustainability of collusion is, say ￿ uctuations in
demand may leave out crucial factors which might render such exercises as in-
complete.
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